This article uses detailed industry and household data to understand why Morocco's labor market performed poorly in 1985-95. The data indicate that marked structural changes and weak demand in the product market were responsible. This article makes two contributions to the literature. The first is specific: it underscores that the demand for labor is a derived demand and that the performance of the product market is an important determinant of the performance of the labor market. The second is more general: it demonstrates that this kind of microeconomic analysis, using data sets that are often available in developing countries, can inform policy design.
Since 1985 Morocco has experienced increasing unemployment in urban areas and stagnant wages in the manufacturing sector (World Bank 1995) . We must understand the reasons for the labor market's poor performance in order to design policies that will help to generate adequate jobs and earnings. In this article we use two data sets for Morocco to demonstrate how standard econometric techniques can disentangle the causes of such poor performance. These types of data sets are often available in developing countries.
We look at demand-and supply-side factors to explain Morocco's stagnant earnings growth. On the supply side, this stagnation could reflect a deterioration in the quality of the labor force. If so, policy reform should concentrate on improving the external and internal efficiency of expenditures on general education and vocational training. On the demand side, weak job and earnings growth may be a result of inappropriate government intervention: a stringent labor code that impedes firms' ability to hire and fire workers or a minimum wage policy that reduces firms' incentives to create jobs. If so, policy reform should include legislation to liberalize labor market regulations.
In this article we argue that the labor market's poor performance during 1986-95 can be traced to, first, a shift in the employment composition of manufacturing to low-paying industries linked to the export sector, which depressed average wages, and, second, stagnant product demand, which weakened the derived demand for labor. Stagnant product demand also explains Morocco's high unem-ployment: although there has been some employment growth in the formal manufacturing sector, that growth has been too weak to offset the expansion of the urban labor force.
Supply-side changes over the past decade have put upward, not downward, pressure on earnings. A much higher proportion of workers were in their prime earning years in 1993 than in 1986. The average education level of the labor force was also higher in 1993 than in 1986. As for demand, standard measures of labor market flexibility show that labor market rigidity is not the prime reason for poor performance: Morocco's recourse to temporary contracts has allowed firms to adjust their employment levels as freely as firms in countries that are part of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). In particular, the elasticity of labor demand with respect to output, rates of job creation and destruction, and speed of adjustment to demand shocks in Morocco are similar to those in other OECD countries.
One reason for the stagnant wages in Morocco is that low-paying industries have been the major source of employment growth. The three industries with the fastest employment growth over the past decade-processed food, textiles, and clothing-are also the three with the lowest average earnings per worker. An obvious policy measure for stimulating the labor market would be one that seeks to increase sales as well as the earnings and productivity of workers in such firms. Although the average performance of firms has been weak (in terms of generating revenue, value added, or sales), key industries, such as textiles and clothing, have outperformed other industries, with clothing increasing its employment more than 300 percent over the decade.
I. DATA
We use two data sets in the analysis. Data describing the supply side come from the World Bank 's 1990-91 Moroccan Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) . This household survey provides detailed socioeconomic information on about 19,000 individuals. Of these, 9,685 are between the ages of 18 and 65, and 1,946 report wage and salary earnings (40 percent of men and 8 percent of women). This last group is the basis of our analysis.
The fact that the analysis focuses on a subset of the working population highlights an important point: because of the difficulty of collecting data on the informal sector, our analysis applies only to the formal sector. Although this limitation makes the results less general, stimulating the growth of the formal sector is a key policy focus of both the Moroccan government and the World Bank. Indeed, a healthy formal sector is critical to economic development.
Most of the key variables used are standard for this type of study-age, education, industry and occupation, and region of residence. However, the earnings measure is monthly earnings, which does not include benefits, such as pensions, holidays, and in-kind transfers. We measure education in years according to the level of qualification achieved. Since the survey does not capture actual experi-ence, we construct a measure of potential experience as the age of the worker minus years of education minus seven.
Data on the demand side come from an annual census of all manufacturing firms in the formal sector with more than 10 workers and a sample of those with 10 or fewer. There are a total of 61,897 observations (starting with 3,692 firms in 1984 and ending with 6,036 firms in 1995), dropping firms that report having no employees. Of the full sample of firms, 59,398 report in three or more years. But the usual problems "with nonreporting arise: only 51,858 observations have value added measures, for example. There is also the possibility that firms spuriously drop into and out of the data set. But since more than 68 percent of the firms report positive employment in at least 9 of the 12 years, and these firms account for 80 percent of employment, the qualitative impact on the data is minimal.
Although the key variables we use are standard, it is worth discussing the measurement of some of them. Firms report both permanent employment and total days worked by temporary employees. We transform this measure into total employment by summing permanent employment and the annual equivalent of temporary employment (total days worked divided by 220). We calculate average wages by dividing total payroll by total employment-so lower wages may reflect either a change in the composition of workers or a true decrease in wages for a particular type of worker.
The measure of capital stock is difficult to construct, and we follow the literature in using the gross book value of fixed assets, which is reported in 1990, and the perpetual inventory method of depreciating investment, which is reported every year. There are obvious problems with this approach. First, and most critical, the key base variable-book value-does not represent the economic value of capital. Second, firms do not report the proportion of their capital that is plant and the proportion that is equipment. Third, many firms do not report the book value at all. Finally, the estimate of the depreciation rate (chosen to be 5 percent) is arbitrary and does not reflect industry differences or different proportions of plant and equipment. We thus follow Currie and Harrison (1997) and use a variation of firm fixed effects to verify the robustness of the results when capital stock is used.
II. WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT IN MOROCCO
Data from the annual employment survey conducted by the government's Statistical Institute show that in the past decade Morocco's population growth has averaged 2.2 percent a year, and its labor force growth has been slightly lower. But the growth rate of the urban labor force has been much higher because of strong migration from rural areas to the cities. Between 1986 and 1995 the urban labor force grew at 5 percent a year, while the rural labor force declined in absolute terms. However, net job growth in urban areas was only 4 percent a year. This differential, coupled with increasing participation rates by women, boosted unemployment rates and shifted jobs to the informal sector. The official urban unemployment rate hovers around 20 percent, affecting about 1.2 million people.
Between 1985 and 1995 employment growth in the formal urban sector was strongly correlated with the performance of manufactured exports. Employment grew with manufactured exports in the late 1980s, but slowed considerably in the 1990s (figure 1).
The period of growth in the 1980s was the result of several factors. First, Morocco benefited from its privileged access to European markets, which it secured through various trade agreements with the European Union. Second, manufactured exports became more competitive when the real effective exchange rate depreciated because of falling unit labor costs (measured in local currency). During the 1980s manufactured exports grew at an annual rate of 23 percent, and employment grew at 11 percent. Although this combination of factors produced strong employment expansion, it was short-lived.
In the 1990s unit labor costs reversed their downward trend as real wages rose slightly and productivity declined (figures 1 and 2). At the same time, the real effective exchange rate appreciated, making Moroccan exports more expensive abroad. All of these elements came together at a moment when Eastern European and Asian competitors were also granted access to European markets, pushing out Moroccan goods. Manufactured exports grew at only 4 percent a year during 1990-95, and employment grew at less than 2 percent a year. Our formal analysis follows a simple supply and demand approach of the type proposed by Bound and Johnson (1992) . The aggregate manufacturing workforce is composed of i demographic groups defined by age and education, working in / different industries. The wage rate of each group of workers is W it and the relative rent of each worker in industry / is p,-. The average wage in manufacturing at time t, w tJ is a simple weighted average of the number of workers in each skill group (pi t ) at time t and their relative rents:
Wage changes in this model can be written as
If we assume that the wage of each demographic group is exogenous and not a function of the group's relative supply, then wage changes are simply driven either by changes in the number of workers in each demographic group or by the allocation of the same group of workers across different industries. This is clearly a very strong assumption, since it reduces the importance of wages as a mechanism for allocating resources. However, since neither linked worker-firm data nor repeated, relatively large-scale household surveys exist, we are forced to focus on quantity rather than price adjustments.
In the next two sections we apply this model to examine explanations that focus on changes in the relative supply of different groups of labor and those that focus on shifts in product demand.
IV. LABOR SUPPLY
Earnings may become stagnant because of a deterioration in the quality of the labor force. It may be that the average educational level has deteriorated or that the workforce has fewer experienced prime-age workers. In this section we examine each of these possibilities by simulating how a shift in the composition of the labor force would have affected average earnings had wages remained constant during 1986-95.
The Distribution of Education in the Urban Labor Force
The effect that the distribution of education will have on average earnings depends on the return to education and the distribution of workers with different types of education. We estimate returns to education with standard Mincerian earnings models using LSMS data and examine the distribution of workers using published national statistics.
In most countries age-earnings profiles vary with the level of education: workers with relatively little education have flatter earnings profiles than workers who are highly educated. This pattern holds in Morocco. The results of our Mincerian regressions indicate that the return to investment in education is about 10 percent a year, using hourly earnings as the dependent variable (table 1) . At least part of this return comes from an economic rent associated with working in certain industries and occupations. Once industry and occupational dummies are included in the regression, the return to education drops to about 4-5 percent.
Given that the return to education is positive and reasonably large, we then ask whether stagnant real earnings result from a deterioration in the quality of the labor force. In general, this is unlikely, since the education level of the potential labor force does not change rapidly over time. However, the education level of the employed labor force may vary markedly if workers at one end of the education spectrum drop out or if large cohorts of uneducated workers enter. In Morocco the change has been an increase in the quality of labor: the proportion of workers with no primary school qualifications fell between 1986 and 1990 and again, more sharply, between 1990 and 1993. Thus the net effect of the changing educational structure of the employed labor force was to raise earnings over what they would have been otherwise. In particular, because of the increase in the education level of the employed labor force during 1986-93, average earnings actually rose by DH240 (dirhan) relative to what they would have been had education remained at the 1990 level. These results suggest that the immediate source of stagnant earnings and productivity growth was not a deterioration in the educational quality of the employed formal labor force. The proportion of highly educated workers rose. And since the wages of highly educated workers are higher than those of less educated workers, this change in proportion should have put upward pressure on earnings.
The Age Structure of the Urban Labor Force
Another potential source of change in labor quality is the age structure of the labor force. Part of the stagnation in average earnings in the United States in the 1970s came from an increase in the number of youth and women in the labor force, both of which have historically had fewer skills than prime-age males. This was not the case in Morocco, despite the fact that the labor force grew markedly over this period.
Much of this growth came from the disproportionately large increase in the number of workers ages 35-44, that is, prime-age workers, presumably those who moved to urban areas from the countryside. According to published national statistics, the number of workers in this age group grew 39 percent in 1986-93, increasing their proportional representation in the labor force 3.56 percent. Thus we are led to the interesting question of how this pure age-related change affected average earnings (the effect can be calculated in the same fashion as above). The change in the age distribution actually increased mean earnings in Morocco by DH52 in excess of what they would have been had the age distribution remained the same.
In sum, then, changes in the age and education composition of the workforce raised the level of earnings and should have increased labor productivity in urban areas. Other explanations for the stagnation must be found.
V. LABOR DEMAND
Since stagnant average earnings are clearly not the result of changes in labor supply, we turn to the demand side of the market for an explanation. Earnings could stagnate if the demand for labor does not respond normally to demand shocks, if the labor market is unable to reallocate workers from less productive to more productive activities, or if there has been a structural shift in employment from high-paying to low-paying industries. We examine each of these in turn.
The Derived Demand for Labor
Since the demand for labor is a derived demand, it is extremely important to examine the health of the product market. In Morocco average firm performance did not change markedly over 1985-95 (figure 2). Revenue generated per worker actually fell below the 1985 level, as did productivity. It is worth noting in this context that although exports per worker grew dramatically in the late 1980s, the 1990s have seen a substantial drop in the growth rate, with investment actually falling in 1994 and 1995.
We can examine the effect of this change on labor demand by estimating fairly standard labor demand equations of the form:
In L A = p 0 + Pi In M/ / > + p 2 In W^+p 3 r + e^.
Thus the.demand for labor, L, in firm /"at time t is determined by the average wage of the workers, w, and the value added, VA, in firm /at time t. We face two estimation problems. First, the Moroccan data are very similar to U.S. data, which are characterized by vast heterogeneity across firms because of differences in the quality of inputs, outputs, and managers (Dunne and Roberts 1993; Haltiwanger, Lane, and Spletzer 1999) . Fortunately, however, our data set is quite rich: it comprises longitudinal data spanning 12 years and about 5,000 firms. Thus we are able to follow Dunne and Roberts (1993) in using fixed effects both to account for unobservable heterogeneity and to minimize simultaneity bias. The second problem is that both wages and value added are likely to be contemporaneously correlated with the error term. We address this issue by also reporting the results using lagged values as instruments. The first column in table 2 reports the results of estimating equation 3 by ordinary least squares (controlling for fixed effects). The elasticity of labor demand with respect to value added is 0.368, indicating that employment is indeed responsive to product demand shocks. Both this elasticity and the own-wage elasticity are well within the range of empirical estimates for other countries (Hamermesh 1993) , regardless of whether we use the least squares estimates or the instrumental variable estimates. Hence firms in Morocco respond to market stimuli in similar ways as firms in other countries. However, the growth rate of employment in each firm is extremely sluggish: firms expand about 1 percent a year.
The results are stable when we examine firms at a more detailed level (table 3) . The own-wage elasticity always falls within reasonable bounds and, in fact, is remarkably stable for firms of different sizes. Export-oriented firms (defined as firms whose sales are more than 50 percent exports) are more responsive to wage increases than are their domestically oriented counterparts. State-owned firms (defined as firms with more than 50 percent state ownership) are more wage sensitive than private firms.
These results suggest that Moroccan labor demand is not much different from that in other countries, at least with respect to observable responses to market stimuli. It may be true that regulation lowers labor demand in all countries, but the evidence does not suggest that the effect in Morocco is unusually strong. We now examine labor market flexibility by comparing job creation and job destruction rates in Moroccan firms. Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (1998) establish that in the United States more than half of productivity growth is due to the reallocation of resources from less productive to more productive firms. Thus the movement of workers across firms is likely to be an important source of productivity (and hence wage) growth. In this section we examine the two components of job reallocation: job creation (the positive change in employment at the firm level, divided by average firm employment) and job destruction (the negative change in employment at the firm level, divided by average firm employment), which have often been used as measures of labor market flexibility (see Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh 1996) . Indeed, OECD (1996) finds a negative relationship between the job destruction rate and the index of labor market regulation.
Labor Flexibility
With average job creation and destruction rates hovering around 12 percent, Morocco shows a degree of labor market flexibility similar to that of OECD countries (figure 3). These figures confirm earlier work by Currie and Harrison (1997) , •who offer anecdotal evidence that labor market adjustment is quite fluid and demonstrate that another measure of labor market flexibility-firms' speed of adjustment to demand shocks-falls within international norms.
The difference between the volatility in permanent and temporary employment is also marked, suggesting that Moroccan firms are using temporary employment as a way of adjusting to demand shocks (figures 4 and 5). Using temporary employment in this way, while consistent with employment praaices in other countries, does pose some long-run concerns for the development of a skilled and productive workforce and for the flexibility of permanent workers.
Again, a closer examination of these trends suggests that all classes of firms, defined by size, export orientation, and state ownership, are roughly equivalent to international standards of flexibility (see the last two rows of table 3). The result for state-owned firms is particularly surprising and suggests that there is widespread avoidance of the labor code, even in the state-owned sector. 
Sectoral Shifts
The last possible explanation for stagnant wage growth is that the structure of the economy has changed from high-productivity and high-wage industries to low-productivity and low-wage industries. That this is a possibility is immediately evident from an examination of individual industries (table 4). The three largest industries that also display some of the highest employment growthprocessed food, textiles, and clothing-are the three with some of the lowest earnings (they are ranked sixteenth, fourteenth, and eighteenth, respectively, in terms of average payroll). Although earnings are much higher in beverages and tobacco, electrical and electronic equipment, and base metal products, job creation in these industries has been relatively flat or declining. The only industry to combine both high earnings and high employment growth is the chemicals industry.
Another way of looking at sectoral changes is through the job creation and destruction rates of high-wage and low-wage firms. We call firms "high-wage" if their average payroll exceeds the average payroll for all firms in a given a year. We classify "low-wage" firms similarly. We then track their patterns of job creation and job destruction over time (figure 6). It is clear that job creation and job destruction are higher in low-wage than in high-wage firms and that net job creation is positive for low-wage firms and negative for high-wage firms. In other words, employment growth is occurring at the low end of the wage spectrum.
Finally, we decompose the growth in average wages between 1984 and 1995 by simplifying equation 2 to focus solely on changes in industry composition, rather than on changes in workforce composition. We thus note that w, = w jt p jt , where w t is the average wage at time t, w jt is the average wage in industry; at time t, and p jt is industry fs employment share. Thus:
or, the change in the average wage is the sum of the change in the wage of each industry weighted by that industry's share of employment (the first term on the right side) and the change in the industry's share of employment, weighted by average wages at time t -1 (the second term on the right side). Applying this simple decomposition reveals that had the sectoral distribution of employment remained the same between 1984 and 1995, average wages would have been 9.8 percent higher. The same holds true for a similar decomposition of productivity: because employment has grown in the least productive sector of the economy, if employment shares had stayed the same between 1985 and 1995, average productivity would have been 20.1 percent higher.
VI. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Our initial concern was to explain poor employment and earnings growth in the Moroccan economy. The evidence presented above strongly suggests that the poor performance in the past 12 years is not a result of inadequate education or labor market rigidities. Rather, structural changes in Morocco were behind the labor market's poor performance. If the strong growth of the clothing industry, for example, had been seen in the rest of the manufacturing sector, overall employment would have grown by an astounding 352 percent and presumably would have reduced the unemployment problem commensurately. However, the stagnation of earnings is also directly attributable to the growth of this relatively low-paying sector of the economy. In order to examine the structural changes in more detail, we estimate (but do not report) industry-specific labor demand regressions and find wide variation in the elasticity of responsiveness to product demand (that is, value added). In particular, the industry with the greatest employment response to increases in product demand is also one of the lowest paid: the textiles and hosiery industry. An increase of 10 percent in value added would increase employment anywhere from 2.4 percent to 4 percent-about 1,700 workers. We see the same responsiveness in another important, but low-wage, Moroccan industry, the clothing industry: a 10 percent increase in product demand would increase employment by almost 5 percent, or more than 5,000 workers. A rise in demand in other industries would have much less impact on employment either because employment levels are lower or employment is less responsive to demand shocks, or both. For example, the employment responsiveness of the relatively highly paid beverage industry to demand shocks is about one-seventh that of textiles.
This analysis suggests that the twin targets of increasing employment and increasing average earnings may not be feasible given the current structure of Moroccan industry. A more detailed study of the two strongest industries, clothing and textiles, indicates that even within these growing industries, the most successful firms are competing on the basis of relatively low wages. In the clothing industry the firms that are in the top quartile of employment growth in any given year have a higher ratio of exports to revenue than firms in the bottom quartile of employment growth (73 percent compared with 65 percent). However, these fast-growing firms are also less productive and offer lower wages (productivity per worker is 20 percent less, but wages are equally discounted). They are also younger-the average age of a firm in the top quartile is 8.9 years, whereas that of a firm in the bottom quartile is 11.13 years. The textile industry has a similar structure. The firms in the top quartile are 20 percent less productive (mirrored by equally discounted wages) and are younger, averaging 17 years compared with 20 years for firms in the bottom quartile.
The role of exports in the labor market is important since job growth is highly correlated with export growth. Also, Morocco substantially reduced both tariffs and import restrictions in 1983, which had substantial effects on employment, probably bringing about the subsequent structural changes.
The view that the future of employment growth lies in the relatively low-wage sector is reinforced by a recent World Bank report (World Bank 1993) showing that the clothing industry is the most export-oriented of all Moroccan industries. It exported 90 percent of its output in 1995. Although less visible, the textile industry surged in its percentage of exports, moving from 15 percent of its output in 1984 to 41 percent in 1995. The only other industries to display similar export competitiveness in 1995 are processed food (28 percent), leather products (60 percent), and chemical products (38 percent). It is possible that wages in declining sectors were artificially high and that competition is eliminating these jobs. If so, structural adjustment assistance might be justified to compensate the affected workers. The main policy change would then be to encourage export competition. Clerides, Lach, and Tybout (1998) find that the most efficient firms become exporters and that learning-by-exporting may have characterized Moroccan firms in the apparel and leather industries. So, clearly, modernizing the capital stock and introducing new technology to firms in exporting industries would make sense. Doing so could also increase average earnings in the low-paid clothing and textile industries, especially if accompanied by on-the-job-training. A recent World Bank study on training in Morocco (World Bank 1996) reveals that only 4 percent of Moroccan firms engage in any formal training and that average earnings and productivity in these firms are much higher than in others.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this article we explain Morocco's poor labor market performance in the 1990s. We use detailed industry and household data to determine that this poor performance is primarily the result of marked structural changes and reflects the country's weak product market. This article underscores the fact that the demand for labor is a derived demand and that the performance of the product market is an important determinant of the performance of the labor market. It also demonstrates that this kind of microeconomic analysis, using data sets that are often available in developing countries, can inform policy design.
But the article leaves unanswered a more fundamental question-the role of wages and worker mobility in the adjustment process. This analysis does not track workers over time and across industries, and hence cannot determine whether wages changed for the same set of workers over time or whether one set of workers was replaced by another set. Both may have occurred. In the first case the notion that there are interindustry and even intraindustry wage differentials for similar workers has a long tradition in labor economics (Dunlop 1957) . Recent, compelling empirical evidence has reinforced this conclusion for industrial countries (Krueger and Summers 1988; Groshen 1991; Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis 1999) . The latter case is also possible, given the different skill needs of expanding and contracting industries. The Moroccan data set that we use does not permit us to investigate this question-although knowing whether workers in the lowwage clothing and textile industries in 1995 are the same workers who were in the high-wage base metals industry in 1985 would have obvious policy implications. Developing a linked employer-employee data set that enables us to answer this intriguing question is the next part of our research agenda.
